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Choice of forum can mean joyous victory or depressing
defeat. A wrong selection and it's enemy territory: a
jurisdiction where the prevailing law, available remedies,
courtroom procedures, and juror attitudes are inimical to
your client. A correct choice and, as Don Corleone once
said, "They will fear you."'
More and more, people and interest groups are becoming
acutely aware of the practical significance of federal
jurisdiction... the way in which technical jurisdictional
matters do, in fact, affect substantive interests, policies, and
values.2
A. Introduction
Year by year, the forum selection battle, particularly the struggle
between plaintiffs' and defense attorneys over whether particular
litigation should be conducted in state courts or federal courts,
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School.
The author wishes to thank the staff of the Loyola Law Review, and in
particular, Stephanie Lashbrook and the team of student authors who worked
so hard in preparing their chapters.
1. Gita F. Rothschild, Forum Shopping, LITIGATION, Spring 1998, at 40.
See also Edward M. Mullins & Rima Y. Mullins, You Better Shop Around:
Appellate Forum Shopping, LITIGATION, Summer 1999, at 32.
2. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Caseload Burdens and Jurisdictional
Limitations: Some Observations from the History of the Federal Courts, 46
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 7, 19, 25 (2002-2003).
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becomes ever more fierce, with the stakes in terms of winning or
losing, and at what cost becoming ever higher.
I write a bimonthly column on forum selection for the National
Law Journal, and it would be unseemly for the National Law Journal
to run such a column if the practice were a bad or unethical thing.
So, "forum selection," i.e., the process of choosing among various
proper fora for resolving a case, must be a good thing. On the other
hand, most of us picked up in law school the notion that somehow
"forum shopping" is evil. Are forum selection and forum shopping
the same thing? Or is forum shopping somehow different and really
evil? To the extent that forum selection is a good thing, there are
numerous technical rules and statutes to be mastered in order to
obtain the forum of one's choice, and our conceptions of federalism
often complicate the problem, as the student notes in this
Developments Issue detail.
I have often written and tell my students all the time that a
plaintiffs lawyer is guilty of malpractice if he or she does not
consider which forum is the best for resolving a client's dispute.
And, a defense attorney similarly disserves a client if she pays no
attention to whether a case can be better resolved in a different
jurisdiction. Forum selection analysis is thus not only an ethical
practice, but it would be unethical not to engage in it because the
client's cause may be better served in a different forum. Yet, we still
see references to "outrageous" and "blatant" "forum shopping" that
needs to be stamped out.
A decision in the BankAmerica3 securities fraud litigation
demonstrates that where one pair of eyes sees forum shopping,
another may simply see ethical conduct. Are there any lessons to be
learned? Even if the BankAmerica case fails to provide guidance as
to what is good forum selection practice as opposed to bad forum
shopping, it will provide a good review of the forum maneuvering
that characterizes much complex litigation today. Thus, in this
Foreword, I will tell the story of BankAmerica in order to illustrate
the problem and to show some of its complexities. I will then turn to
a discussion of Congress's ongoing efforts in the area of federal
3. See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (E.D.
Mo. 2000).
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jurisdiction and conclude by introducing the student articles that
address many of the myriad technical aspects of the federal-state
forum selection battle that occupy the attention of the courts today.
B. A Forum Selection Story
In September 1998, BankAmerica Corporation and NationsBank
Corporation merged to form a new BankAmerica.4 Within a month
and a half, twenty-four class actions were filed in six federal district
courts and seven class actions were filed in California state courts
alleging fraudulent conduct in connection with the merger.5 One of
the federal class action lawsuits was filed by a prominent securities
class action firm, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, at the
same time as it filed five of the California state court class actions.
6
The Multidistrict Litigation Panel transferred the federal cases to the
Eastern District of Missouri, and Judge John F. Nangle was
appointed to handle the litigation.7 When it became apparent that
Milberg Weiss could not be chosen as lead counsel because its
clients lacked the financial stake necessary under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, it sought to dismiss the federal
action in order to pursue the California actions, which had been
consolidated in the federal multidistrict litigation as Desmond v.
BankAmerica Corp.,8 where it would not be faced with the federal
financial stake rules. The other federal plaintiffs and defendants
objected to the dismissal because they feared that, at some point, the
state court class actions would conflict with the federal proceedings.
9
Finding no such current conflict, Judge Nangle allowed Milberg
Weiss to dismiss its federal case.
10
For the next nine months, Milberg Weiss sought class
certification of the state court actions.11 The first motion for




8. See Desmond v. BankAmerica Corp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
9. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 1046-48.
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certification was denied. 12  Just before the hearing on a second
motion, the defendants filed a notice of removal, alleging that the
state class action was removable under the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).13 The case was remanded
to state court because the Northern District of California federal
judge thought the removal was premature. 14 He left the door open
for removal, however. At this point, Milberg Weiss wrote the state
court judge, Superior Court Judge William Cahill, indicating
counsel's intention to restructure the proposed classes in order to
make the case unremovable. 15 A third motion for class certification
was then filed, but taken off the calendar so that the state court cases
could be mediated. 16 The federal plaintiffs thereupon moved, in
Judge Nangle's court, for an injunction barring the state
proceedings.'
7
Finding that his trust that Milberg Weiss would cooperate with
the federal litigants and would not create conflicts between the state
and federal lawsuits was misplaced, Judge Nangle entered an
injunction barring Milberg Weiss from prosecuting the state court
actions.18 He found that Congress's intent to have those with the
highest financial stake control securities class actions was frustrated
by Milberg Weiss and the California plaintiffs, who "succeeded in
having premature settlement negotiations ordered by the California
court." 9 Further, Judge Nangle excoriated Milberg Weiss' conduct:
Additionally, Milberg Weiss's behavior in these cases are
precisely the sort of lawyer-driven machinations the
PSLRA [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act] was
designed to prevent. Hindsight now reveals that the
simultaneous filing of suits in state and federal court was a
blatant attempt at forum shopping. When the federal forum
proved unsavory because Milberg Weiss would not be able
to control that case, the firm simply took its marbles and
12. Id. at 1047.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1047-48.
15. Id. at 1048.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 1045.
18. See id. at 1053.
19. Id. at 1050.
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went to play in the state court. In that forum, they have
filed numerous inadequate motions for class certification,
overlooking potential conflicts of interest among classes
and failing to propose class representatives which truly
represent the entire class. Furthermore, one proposed class
representative was highly inadequate due to his criminal
record and history of participation in fraud. They have
attempted to circumvent the prohibitions of the SLUSA by
adding nonparty plaintiffs as class representatives, which
would effectively create a new state securities law suit after
the effective date of the SLUSA. When faced with the
possibility that such an action would result in removal of
the case to federal court, they indicated their intent to
structure the classes, not in the best interests of the class
members, but to avoid federal court at all costs. When that
task proved difficult, they requested the state court to order
mediation for settlement purposes, despite the fact that they
do not represent the class and despite the fact that minimal
discovery has been done either on the substantive issues or
the damages available to class members. Clearly, the
Desmond case is nothing more than a thinly-veiled attempt
to circumvent federal law. The Desmond plaintiffs, and the
law firm behind them, do not have the best interests of the
class at heart and have proved themselves wholly
inadequate to control the conduct of this suit. The Court
finds their attempts to do so outrageous. Accordingly,
under the facts of this case, the Court finds that an
injunction is necessary to preserve the federal plaintiffs'
rights under the PSLRA.2 °
Obviously, Milberg Weiss was trying to avoid federal
jurisdiction and the negative effects of federal law on the claims they
sought to vindicate. Putting aside the question of problems with
some of the proposed class representatives, we should ask whether
an attorney seeking to achieve a better result in state court on state
law claims is a bad thing. In BankAmerica, for example, potentially
20. Id.
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billions of dollars that allegedly could be recovered only under state
law were at stake.2'
Let us begin by looking at the California state court's opinion of
Milberg Weiss' conduct. In contrast to Judge Nangle's stinging
rebuke, Judge Cahill issued an order addressing the injunction stating
that Milberg Weiss and defendants' counsel were all "of the highest
quality" and that they had "conducted themselves in a professional
and ethical manner throughout this litigation in the California
Superior Court., 22 Judge Cahill's statement finding that Milberg
Weiss' conduct was ethical is important for two reasons. First, it
demonstrates that the evil of forum shopping exists more in the mind
of the beholder than anywhere else. Second, it raises the point
missed by Judge Nangle: if the state court does not view the
proceedings before it as frivolous, why is it wrong for litigants to
seek a better deal for their clients in state court? Ultimately, Judge
Nangle may be correct that the federal law should and will trump the
state court proceedings. But, the federal statutes invoked by the
federal court were new. Why should plaintiffs' counsel be prevented
from developing non-frivolous arguments for avoiding its negative
consequences by trying to litigate in a better forum?
The next question then would be whether Judge Nangle was
correct in enjoining Milberg Weiss from prosecuting the California
state court actions. My response is yes. The BankAmerica case
seemed to be a relatively clear case for invoking the exceptions to the
Anti-Injunction Act 23 and All Writs Act24 to prevent state court cases
from interfering with federal court jurisdiction. Judge Nangle is
correct that Congress is seeking to corral all litigation in the nature of
securities fraud in the federal courthouses and to keep them out of
state courts. He therefore quite clearly was correct that the recently
enacted private securities litigation statutes were designed to be an
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. My quarrel with Judge Nangle
is his unnecessary criticism of Milberg Weiss' conduct to reach his
result.
21. See Dennis J. Opatmy, Federal Judge Rips Into Milberg Weiss, NAT'L
L.J., May 22, 2000, at B5.
22. Id.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
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On a broader note, it is ironic that in our present days of the
New Federalism championed by the conservative members of the
Supreme Court, we see Congress trying to channel class actions
raising state law claims away from state courts.25  For example,
although it has been taken off the legislative table for now, Congress
came very close to enacting (and the President would have signed
into law) the Class Action Fairness Act,26 which would herd many
state court class actions into federal court. It may well be that such
legislation, like the Securities Litigation Reform and Uniform Act of
1998 (SLUSA), will prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their state
rights in state court. But, so long as there is a reasonable argument
for pursuing the claims in a particular forum, an attorney has a duty
to consider whether to litigate there. Perhaps the downsides of defeat
are too great to risk the necessary resources, but certainly there
should be no ethical bar to doing so. Trying to stay in state court and
out of federal court may appear manipulative, but it is nothing new.
Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit stated:
A plaintiff is entitled to file both state and federal causes of
action in state court. The defendant is entitled to remove.
The plaintiff is entitled to settle certain claims or dismiss
them with leave of the court. The district court has discretion
to grant or deny remand. Those are the pieces that comprise
plaintiffs' allegedly manipulative pleading practices. We are
not convinced that such practices were anything to be
discouraged.27
Similarly, lawyers should not be chastised and punished for the
evil of forum shopping unless the claims they bring are frivolous or
the forum they have chosen plainly lacks jurisdiction over the
matter. 28  Rather, they should be applauded for engaging in the
25. See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional
Federalism: The Implications of the New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort
Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1559 (2000)
(discussing the federalism and comity problems with Congress's passage of
bills that strip state courts of jurisdiction over mass tort and other complex
class actions in favor of federal courts).
26. H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003).
27. Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1995).
28. See, e.g., Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding that it was not sanctionable to file colorable claims in a proper but
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appropriate and necessary practice of forum selection. To put it
another way, forum shopping is bad and evil if we mean the bringing
of claims in an improper forum. Unless that test is met, however,
whether we call it forum shopping or manipulative pleading or forum
selection, lawyers should not fear damage to their reputations or
sanctions for engaging in it.
C. Congressional Action Bearing on Forum Selection
1. General Federal Jurisdictional Provisions
Perhaps the most important aspect of forum selection is the
choice between federal or state courts. However, it is well-known
that the law of federal courts and jurisdiction is quite confusing and
difficult to understand. Congressional action during the past few
decades in the area of federal civil practice has resulted in numerous
important changes adding greater complexity and confusion. In
addition to attempts to speed up litigation and find ways to reduce
costs, Congress amended several basic federal subject matter
jurisdiction statutes, including the removal statutes, and enacted a
new supplemental jurisdiction statute in an effort to codify various
judicially-created doctrines relating to federal subject matter
jurisdiction. The student notes in this Developments Issue on the
topics of diversity jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction, removal
jurisdiction, and supplemental jurisdiction will discuss the case law
that has developed interpreting these amendments, as well as other
problems raised by these jurisdictional provisions that have troubled
the courts in recent years. When reading the discussion below of the
recently amended and adopted statutes and the case law interpreting
them, it may be useful to point out the apparent objectives of
Congress. First, many of the changes, with some important
exceptions for complex litigation, seem to be part of a continuing
trend to limit diversity jurisdiction. Second, Congress provided
expanded opportunities for asserting federal question jurisdiction.
Third, Congress significantly changed removal procedures. A final
observation, however, is that in many important respects, Congress's
inconvenient forum for the purpose of exerting settlement pressure on a related
case).
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action did little to clarify the law. Instead, its measures contributed
to the confusion as the lower federal courts struggle to interpret the
new statutes.
Against these overall trends that can be gleaned from the cases
interpreting the general jurisdictional statutes, are other recent
statutes enacted by Congress, including the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) involved in the forum
selection story told above, that raise difficult federalism issues
because of their effect of expanding federal jurisdiction at the
expense of the states.
2. Special Federal Jurisdictional Provisions
a. private securities class actions
Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the
29Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA),
which bars most securities class actions based on state law fraud
theories. It supplements the PSLRA that was designed to heighten
the standards for prosecuting such actions in federal court. SLUSA
is designed to close a perceived loophole in the PSLRA. Supporters
of SLUSA believed that the increased filing of class actions in state
courts based on state law fraud theories of liability undermined the
PSLRA. SLUSA amended section 16 of the Securities Act of 1933
and section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit
class actions brought by private parties based on such theories.30 It
further provides that state court class actions brought on such
theories are removable to the federal court in the district in which the
state action was filed.3' Moreover, it permits federal courts to stay
discovery in state court actions.
b. the Multiparty, Multidistrict Trial Jurisdiction Act
On November 2, 2002, Congress enacted the Multiparty,
Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 (MMTJA).32 For some
29. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c).
32. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).
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time, Congress has been toying with the idea of enacting legislation
that would provide for expanded federal jurisdiction over mass
accident cases. The MMTJA does just that. It creates a new 28
U.S.C. § 1369, which provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse
parties that arises from a single accident, where at least 75
natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete
location, if-
(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part
of the accident took place in another State or other
location, regardless of whether that defendant is also a
resident of the State where a substantial part of the
accident took place;
(2) any two defendants reside in different States,
regardless of whether such defendants are also
residents of the same State or States; or
(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in
different States.
Subsection (b) creates an exception to the minimum diversity
rule. The district court may not hear any case in which a "substantial
majority" of plaintiffs and the "primary" defendants are all citizens
of the same state; and in which the claims asserted are governed
"primarily" by the laws of that same state. In such circumstances,
only state courts may hear such cases. This feature was one of three
changes proffered to the Senate in an effort to develop greater
support for the prior version of the bill during the waning days of the
106th Congress. However, one wonders how much litigation will
result over what a "substantial majority" of plaintiffs means-a
difficult number to meaningfully quantify, or who the "primary
defendant" is-the airline? The manufacturer of the defective part
that led to a crash?
Subsection (c) sets forth certain "special rules" and definitions.
Subsection (d) permits any person with a claim arising from an
accident as defined by the terms of the bill to intervene as a party
plaintiff, even if that person could not have brought an action in
33. Id.
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district court as an original matter. Presumably, this means that
persons who were injured as well as the estates of those killed may
intervene.
Given other bills Congress had been considering since the
Supreme Court ruled in Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach34 that the transferee judge of a multidistrict litigation under §
1407 may not transfer such cases to the transferee court for trial
purposes, it is surprising that the MMTJA does not address the
problem that the Court's ruling created. Subsection (e) of § 1369 is
the only provision that concerns multidistrict litigation. A federal
district court in which an action is pending under the terms of the bill
must promptly notify the Multidistrict Litigation Panel of the
pendency of the action. The footnote in the House Conference
Report then makes it plain that the Lexecon fix is dead: "All things
considered, the panel attempts to identify the one U.S. district court
nationwide which is best adept at adjudicating pretrial matters. The
panel then remands individual cases back to the districts where they
were originally filed for trial unless they have been previously
terminated.,
35
Not surprisingly, the MMTJA also amends § 1441 to allow
removal if:
(A) the action could have been brought in a United States
district court under section 1369 of this title; or (B) the
defendant is a party to an action which is or could have
been brought, in whole or in part, under section 1369 in a
United States district court and arises from the same
accident as the action in State court.... 36
34. 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
35. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 107-685, at 201 n.4 (2002). In the Spring of 2004,
Congress once again considered a Lexecon fix. The House of Representatives
voted unanimously on March 24, 2004, to enact the 2004 Multidistrict
Litigation Restoration Act (H.R. 1768), which would allow a multidistrict
transferee judge to handle both pretrial matters and trials. However, the bill
would exempt from transferee court jurisdiction the determination of
compensatory damages. See Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress:
H.R. 1768, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.01768: (last
visited April 12, 2004).
36. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,
H.R. 2215, 107th Cong., § 1369 (2002).
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The MMTJA also creates new § 1441(e)(2)-(5), which set forth the
procedure for removal, along with the terms by which an action is
remanded back to state court for determination of damages, including
appellate procedures governing liability.
The MMTJA also liberalizes § 1391, the general federal venue
statute, by permitting any action to be brought in any district court in
which any defendant resides or in which a substantial part of the
accident giving rise to the action took place. The Act also contains
service and subpoena powers similar to the 2001 Act.
The MMTJA, although a sensible piece of legislation in that it
allows for federal consolidation and, thus, arguably an efficient
resolution of mass disaster cases (such as commercial airplane crash
cases), raises important federalism issues. It is noteworthy that the
bill passed by a 400-4 House vote and overwhelming Senate vote as
well.37 Thus, it will be interesting to see whether the MMTJA is a
sign of more drastic legislation that could alter the balance of state-
federal jurisdiction.
c. proposed legislation-Class Action Fairness Act
Indeed, currently under consideration by Congress is even more
drastic, general legislation. These bills would provide for expanded
federal jurisdiction over class actions in which there is minimal
diversity. They would amend § 1332 to allow original jurisdiction
over class actions so long as any member of the class is diverse from
any defendant. They would also enact a removal provision that
allows for any such case filed as a class action in state court to be
removed to federal court. The purpose of these amendments is to
prevent plaintiffs filing state court class actions from preventing
removal of such cases by naming local defendants. The description
of the House version of the legislation states that it is designed:
To amend the procedures that apply to consideration of
interstate class actions to assure fairer outcomes for class
members and defendants, to outlaw certain practices that
provide inadequate settlements for class members, to assure
that attorneys do not receive a disproportionate amount of
37. Senate Passes Conference Report on DOJ Authorization Bill, TECH L.J.
(Oct. 9, 2002), at http://techlawjoumal.com/alert/2002/10/09.asp.
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settlements at the expense of class members, to provide for
clearer and simpler information in class action settlement
notices, to assure prompt consideration of interstate class
actions, to amend title 28, United States Code, to allow the
application of the principles of Federal diversity jurisdiction
to interstate class actions, and for other purposes.38
Although the bills also would allow the federal district court to
decline to exercise jurisdiction and remand under various
circumstances such as when the amount in controversy is relatively
small, when the number of class members is relatively small, when a
substantial number of the purported class members are citizens of the
same state as the primary defendants, or when the claims asserted
would be governed primarily by the law of the state, it is plain that
the Class Action Fairness Act will result in a flood of cases being
removed to federal courts.
The House of Representatives passed the legislation last year,
but the bill died in the Senate in the Fall of 2003. 39  However,
discussions with key democratic senators have led to the possibility
of compromise and enactment of the bill in the Spring of 2004.40
Although, as mentioned above, Congress has postponed
consideration of the Act,4 1 it is not hard to imagine that some form of
the Class Action Fairness Act will be enacted by the 108th or 109th
Congress.
In addition to these legislative developments, the American Law
Institute recently completed its Federal Judicial Code Revision
Project.42 As a part of that study, the American Law Institute issued
its proposal for significant amendments to the problematic
38. H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003).
39. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 Fails to Clear Senate (Oct. 24,
2003), available at http://www.hunton.com/pdfs/newsletter/ClassAction-
Fairness__Bill.pdf.
40. See id.
41. See Mealey Publications, Sources: Class Action Bill "Dead in Water",
(Mar. 17, 2004), at http://www.lexisone.com/news/nlibrary/m031704d.html.
42. FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVISION PROJECT (John B. Oakley, Rep.,
American Law Institute 2004). See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the
American Law Institute's Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 31 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 855 (1998).
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supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. It also proposed
amendments to the removal statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1447.
The past decades have witnessed a flurry of change and
proposals for change. Congress took a very active legislative role
with respect to federal jurisdiction, and it is likely that this trend will
continue. Let us now turn to the six student notes that detail
problems arising under 1) diversity jurisdiction; 2) federal question
jurisdiction; 3) supplemental jurisdiction; 4) removal jurisdiction and
practice; 5) injunctions of state court cases under the Anti-Injunction
and All Writs Acts; and 6) forum non conveniens.
Each of the articles begins with relevant background
information, and then the first four articles provide a detailed
analysis of the difficult problems raised by the federal subject matter
jurisdiction statutes that the courts are struggling to resolve
coherently. The injunctions and All Writs Act article delves into the
difficult problems of federalism posed by our system of concurrent
federal-state jurisdiction, and the forum non conveniens article
provides a look at the evolving case law on forum non conveniens.
Together, the articles provide lawyers engaged in forum selection
battles with the tools they need to argue in the best interests of their
clients while supplying judges with the relevant case law to decide
where the battle will be fought.
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